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The essential dynamics of well-being pivot on the key
conceptual observation that we cannot help but understand
well-being from both an objective and a subjective per-
spective: Life goes well for us when we have what we
need, when we have access to the resources, the people and
the opportunities that make it possible for us to be and do
what we wish. On the other hand, however, we also
strongly believe that our well-being is a feeling, an expe-
rience, usually that of happiness, which is intensively
subjective. Conceptually, in short, both perspectives are
needed both to understand and to secure well-being: hap-
piness without resources, without friends and opportunities,
is either short-lived or empty; but resources, friends and
opportunities without positive experiences, is equally flat
and emotionally empty. Here we have a perfect dilemma:
both perspectives are self-evident and neither is sufficient,
but what creates objective well-being may undermine
subjective well-being, and vice versa. The aim of this
thematic section is to indirectly address this dilemma and
advancing our understanding of the nature and determi-
nants of well-being by conceptually disentangling the
essence of well-being in different contexts and through an
analysis of its essential components and characteristics.
Some of the papers presented here explore factors that
lead to or enhance well-being. Sarah Atkinson proposes an
interpretation of well-being that is always and necessarily
situated and relational. She frames well-being as an
emergent though situated phenomenon with relational
effects that are dependent on the mobilisation of resources
within social and spatial contexts, and in this manner
addresses our dilemma by bridging the standard division
between individual and collective resources, and therefore
subjective and objective determinants of well-being.
In the same vein, Michael Power questions the
assumptions of the so-called ‘positive psychology’ move-
ment and interrogates what he characterises as its naı¨ve
pursuit of happiness. In light of evidence that defensive
pessimists often perform better than optimists, he supports
a psychological capacity he calls flexibility that trades on
the fact that sometimes optimism is a good trait, sometimes
pessimism is, but when reality is accurately known, realism
should supersede both. Whether realism, optimism, or
pessimism is a more prudent temperament depends on a
range of other personal and social factors for which the
same underlying trait of flexibility is also required.
In the context of the Amartya Sen’s capability account,
Christopher A. Riddle discusses the special role of health in
the promotion of well-being. The author claims that
capabilities are not of equal moral worth as some are more
centrally related to, or predictive of, human flourishing.
Health, in particular, is of special moral importance
because of the scope and nature of the disadvantage suf-
fered when one is unhealthy. This kind of disadvantage is
particularly corrosive as it adversely impacts one’s very
ability to secure any other valuable functionings essential
for one’s conception of the good life.
Another group of papers presented in this collection
helps to conceptually clarify the notion of well-being by
juxtaposing it to another, but related concept.
The relationship between welfare or well-being and
human virtue is at the core of Christopher Toner’s paper.
By drawing support from the Aristotelian idea of the link
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between being good and well-being, Toner argues for a
form of welfare perfectionism that can be summarised by
two interrelated claims: first, that the virtuous person’s
welfare is an aspect of that individual’s virtuous activity
and, secondly, that the virtuous person will never be in
position to choose to attain well-being at the expense of
acting virtuously.
Also in the context of health, but from the perspective of
social aesthetics, Michael Musalek explores the relation-
ship between health and well-being from the point of view
of beauty. As the author explains, well-being is inextrica-
bly linked with beauty, and this link might be called joy. A
life that is for the most part lived autonomously and joy-
fully is experienced as well-being; and human beings
believe that we have achieved well-being when we succeed
in living joyfully. The author supports the development of
a human-based medicine that focuses on the restoration or
preservation of a comprehensive state of health in the sense
of complete physical, mental and social well-being, in the
sense of opening up the possibility for a mostly autono-
mous and joyful life.
The characterisation of well-being in the context of
disability is at the core of two papers.
Franziska Felder investigates the issue of which dis-
abilities, if any, are fundamentally detrimental to human
well-being, and for which reasons. Against the general-
isation that disability is itself and always an instance of
reduced well-being in an absolute sense, she supports the
view that a disability is only bad for a person in an absolute
sense if it undermines the very personhood of the indi-
vidual by negating the essential core of functional elements
absolutely crucial to human well-being.
Claire Edwards explores some standard responses to the
so called ‘disability paradox’, namely that while to external
observers the well-being of disabled people appears poor,
people with disabilities themselves report a good if not
superior quality of life. She argues for the view that there is
a need to take account of things other than happiness when
assessing people’s well-being. But she also critically
addresses commonly relied on presumptions about what
‘goods’ are important to people with disabilities and
highlights the need for empirical research on perceptions of
persons with disabilities of their own well-being.
Finally, this thematic section contains two papers that
focus on the characteristics of well-being in two additional
and important contexts.
The paper by Christina Schu¨es and Christoph Rehmann-
Sutter focuses on the well-being of children. As applied to
children, the concept of well-being is embedded in a sense
of the origins or genesis of the child and thus temporally
based and directed towards the good life as a meaningful
life that is sensitive to social context and to the quality of
these relationships. As a result, child well-being is funda-
mentally a relational concept that requires, the authors
argue, a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to clar-
ify what they call the ‘generative insight’.
In the context of policy development, finally, Bruno S.
Frey and Jana Gallus question the trustworthiness of what
has been called a ‘National Happiness Index’ as suitable
and valid aggregation of individual happiness states. In
light of the history of how the parallel notion of life sat-
isfaction was transformed once it has become an official
goal of government policy, they argue in favour of gov-
ernments establishing, democratically, the conditions that
enable individuals to become happy, and recommend that
the results of happiness research be introduced more
directly into the political process.
As editors, we believe that the articles in this thematic
section will open up discussion in important areas in
relation to the essence and determinants of well-being. We
hope that they stimulate further conceptual and empirical
work to support the goal of understanding the metrics for
enhancing well-being at the individual and population
level.
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